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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Clarissa Mae Gouge appeals the district court’s denial of her motion to suppress evidence
discovered as a result of a police officer’s search of her person. She argues, as she did in the
district court, that her consent at the scene was the product of her probation officer’s prior
coercion, rendering her consent involuntary under the Court of Appeals’ holding in State v.
Santana, 162 Idaho 79 (Ct. App. 2017). She asserts that the district court erred by concluding
that Ms. Gouge bore the burden of proving coercion, and also by concluding that Ms. Gouge’s
testimony – that she had signed a probation agreement requiring her consent to the search – was
“not evidence” of the agreement, particularly given the district court’s explicit finding that her
testimony was credible.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The following facts were established at the suppression hearing. 1 In December of 2016,
after pleading guilty to possession of methamphetamine, Ms. Gouge was granted a suspended
sentenced and four years’ supervised probation. (R., p.57.) The district court’s probation order
included the condition, “That you shall submit to searches of your person … at the request of
your probation officer.” (Tr., p.18, Ls.3-9; R., pp.36-41, 57-58.) However, consent to search at
the request of law enforcement was not a condition ordered by the court. (See generally,
R., pp.3-9; Tr., p.31, Ls.5-9.)2 According to her undisputed testimony, which the district court
found credible, Ms. Gouge subsequently met with her probation officer and signed an agreement

1

The State called Officer Mongan and also played a portion of audio and video recording from
his body camera, admitted as Exhibit 1; Ms. Gouge also testified. (See generally, Tr.; Exhibit 1.)
2
The district court emphasized at the suppression hearing, “in this case I didn’t tell Ms. Gouge
when I put her on probation that she had to consent to search of her person … by law
enforcement … (Tr., p.31, Ls.6-9.)
1

with an expanded probation condition that included search requests by law enforcement.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.4-21.)
On March 17, 2017, Ms. Gouge was approached by a police officer while she was sitting
with two others in a pickup truck at a gas station. (R., p.58; Tr., p.6, Ls.2-5.) Coeur d’Alene
Police Officer Kelly Mongan was patrolling the area, and the pickup’s occupants seemed to him
to become nervous as he drove by. (R., pp.58-59.) He pulled into the gas station, parked, and
from behind the pickup, walked up to the passenger door where Ms. Gouge was sitting. (R., p.59;
Tr., p.5, L.18 – p.19, L.12.) He spoke to Ms. Gouge through the opened window, and gathered
all three occupants’ identifications; after running their names through dispatch, Officer Mongan
asked Ms. Gouge and the other passenger, Michael Withey, if either of them were on probation.
(R., p.59; Exhibit 1.) When both Ms. Gouge and Mr. Withey confirmed they were, Officer
Mongan asked, “So, [as] part of your probation do you guys sign a search clause?” to which
Ms. Gouge answered “yes.” (R., p.63.) Officer Mongan then asked, “Would you guys both be
willing to consent to a search of your person?” and Ms. Gouge and Mr. Withey agreed.
(R., p.63; Exhibit 1.) Officer Mongan then explained:
So, I’m going to wait until my partner gets here and then we’ll do that. Alright?
We just like to do probation checks, made sure you guys are, you know, following
along and not doing things that are going to get you into trouble again. Make
sense?
(R., p.63; Exhibit 1.)
Officer Mongan had Ms. Gouge get out of the pickup, walked her to the front of the
patrol car, and then had her put her hands behind her back while he searched her pants pockets.
(R., pp.63-64.) Officer Mongan did not advise Ms. Gouge she had the right to withhold or
withdraw her consent. (See generally Exhibit 1; Tr.) As a result of the search, Officer Mongan
discovered a small baggie of methamphetamine in Ms. Gouge’s pocket. (R., p.59.) Based on
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that evidence, the State charged Ms. Gouge with possession of a controlled substance. (R., pp.6,
23.)
Ms. Gouge filed a motion to suppress the evidence, asserting the search violated her
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.

(R., p.31.)

Specifically, she argued that her consent was involuntary under State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79
(Ct. App. 2017), because her probation officer had improperly coerced her agreement to an
invalid probation condition – that she submit to police requests to search. (R., pp.34-35.)
At the suppression hearing, Ms. Gouge testified that before this incident, when she met
with her probation officer, she was given papers to sign requiring that she consent, and that the
only reason she gave consent to Officer Mongan was “because I thought it was a hundred percent
stipulation that I had to do that because that’s what my P.O. told me to do,” and that “I was just
trying to follow my probation.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.19-22, p.15, Ls.18-20.) At the conclusion of the
suppression hearing, the district court made an explicit finding that Ms. Gouge’s testimony was
credible, stating,
I guess I will find that she seemed credible in remembering that she was told in
probation – in her meeting with probation that she signed an order accepting the
probation department’s I.D.O.C.’s terms and conditions that law enforcement
could search. … I find her credible that she remembered that.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.13-21.)
However, the district court also stated, “[t]hat doesn’t matter, in my analysis…”
(R., p.29, Ls.21-24.) The court explained,
“I don’t think it’s important what Ms. Gouge thought when she was being asked
that question. …. I think the only thing that’s relevant is what Officer Mongan
said, and that was quite clear, ‘Would you guys both be willing to consent to a
search of your person?’ So motion to suppress is denied.”
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(Tr., p.32, Ls.6-7.) In its subsequent written decision, and notwithstanding its previous findings
that Ms. Gouge’s testimony was credible, the district court stated “there is no evidence” of the
probation agreement that Ms. Gouge testified to, because no copy of the document had been
provided. (R., p.58 (emphasis original).) The district court concluded that Ms. Gouge’s motion
“must be denied for lack of proof on the part of Gouge, the moving party. She has not put on
any proof that she was required to consent to a request by law enforcement to search her person.”
(R., p.62.)
The district court went on to conclude that, regardless of whether Ms. Gouge’s probation
officer required her to sign a probation agreement requiring her to consent to law enforcement
searches, Ms. Gouge’s consent was voluntary, because that consent had not been coerced by any
improper conduct on the part of Officer Mongan. (R., p.65.) The district court concluded that
Officer Mongan had requested “ordinary consent” that was “not directly linked” to either “the
fact Gouge was on probation” or “any written consent to a search.” (R., p.65.) However, the
district court also held that, if the search was a probation search, the court would agree with
Ms. Gouge and find that her consent was coerced under the Court of Appeals’ holding and
reasoning in State v. Santana. (R., pp.70-76.)
After the district court denied her suppression motion, Ms. Gouge entered a conditional
plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine, reserving her right to appeal the district court’s
decision. (Tr., p.35, Ls.3-13.) The district court sentenced Ms. Gouge to a suspended seven-year
term, with three years fixed, and placed Ms. Gouge on probation. (Tr., p.61, L.21 – p.62, L.9;
R., pp.89-91.)3 Ms. Gouge timely appealed. (R., p.92.)

3

The district court modified Ms. Gouge’s probation in the earlier case, CRF-2016-17065,
without revoking it, and ordered her probation be continued. (See Tr., p.62, L.12.)
4

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Gouge’s motion to suppress?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Gouge’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The State bears the burden to show that consent to search is voluntary and uncoerced. In

this case, the State has failed to meet that burden. Ms. Gouge’s consent was the product of an
invalid and coerced term in her probation agreement requiring her to submit to law enforcement
searches. The district court erred in concluding her consent was voluntarily given, and erred in
failing to suppress the evidence of the search.

B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a trial court’s order granting or denying a defendant’s motion to

suppress, this Court defers to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810 (2009).

Factual findings that are not supported by

substantial and competent evidence are clearly erroneous. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 659
(2007). “Decisions regarding the credibility of witnesses, weight to be given to conflicting
evidence, and factual inferences to be drawn are also within the discretion of the trial court.”
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 804. However, this Court maintains free review over whether the facts
surrounding the search and seizure satisfy constitutional requirements. Henage, 143 Idaho at
658.

C.

The District Court Erroneously Denied Ms. Gouge’s Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Evidence obtained in violation of
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this constitutionally-guaranteed protection is subject to the exclusionary rule, which requires the
suppression of both primary evidence obtained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure,
and evidence later discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality, that is, “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484–85 (1963); State v.
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 988-98 (1992).
Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable under both the federal
and Idaho constitutions unless they come within one of the established exceptions to the
warrant requirement.

State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886-87 (2015), citing California v.

Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580 (1991); State v. Henderson, 114 Idaho 293, 295 (1988). Once a
defendant has established that a warrantless search occurred, the State bears the burden of
establishing that a valid exception applies. State v. Armstrong, 159 Idaho 364, 370 (Ct. App.
2015).

A search conducted with consent that was voluntary is one such exception.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973).
1.

The State Bears The Burden To Demonstrate Ms. Gouge’s Consent Was
Voluntarily Given And Uncoerced

“The

State

has

the

burden

to

prove

that

consent

was,

in

fact,

freely

and voluntarily given.” Schneckloth, at 229. The State must show that consent was not the result
of duress or coercion, either direct or implied. Id. Although knowledge of the right to refuse is
not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent, “the subject’s knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor
to be taken into account.” Schneckloth, at 249; see State v. Jabora, 143 Idaho 94, 98 (Ct. App.
2006).

Likewise, the “subjective state” of the individual granting the consent is relevant.

Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229; Jabora, 143 Idaho at 98.
A determination of voluntariness does not turn “on the presence or the absence of a single
controlling criterion.” Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226. “Voluntariness” is a “question of fact to be
7

determined by all of the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796
(2003); Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
2.

The State Has Failed In Its Burden To Demonstrate That Ms. Gouge’s Consent
Was Not Coerced

In this case, the district court acknowledged that Ms. Gouge’s consent to search would be
deemed coerced if two factors were present:
Assuming this was a probation search (which the court does not find) and
assuming there is evidence somewhere that Gouge was presented with the
supplemental terms and conditions of probation (with which the court was not
presented), the court finds such consent by Gouge given to her probation officer
was coerced.
(R., p.61.)
Hence, the district court agreed that Ms. Gouge’s consent would be deemed coerced, and
therefore involuntary, if: (1) the search was the product of the consent given in the supplemental
terms and conditions of her probation, and (2) there was evidence that those supplemental terms
in fact existed. As set forth below, both conditions were met and the district court’s conclusions
to the contrary are clearly erroneous.
a.

Ms. Gouge’s Consent Was The Product Of An Invalid Term In Her
Probation Agreement, And Her Consent Given To Officer Mongan’s
Request Was Involuntary Under State v. Santana

Ms. Gouge asserts that the consent given to Officer Mongan was the product of the
invalid term of her probation agreement requiring her to consent to law enforcement searches.
That term was the result of coercion – not by the police officer who conducted the search, but by
her probation officer – rendering her consent involuntary. Therefore, any warrantless searches
conducted pursuant to this invalid term violated her Fourth Amendment rights.

8

This case presents circumstances analogous to those in State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79
(Ct. App. 2017). In that case, Santana had reported to his probation department as required by
the terms of the district court’s probation order. Id., at 82. Santana’s probation officer provided
him a probation agreement containing a Fourth Amendment waiver, authorizing any law
enforcement officer or probation officer to search Santana’s person and residence, and told
Santana to sign it. Id. However, the probation terms pronounced by the sentencing judge in
open court did not include a condition requiring Santana to consent to searches. Id. Following a
warrantless search of his residence by the probation officer and police, Santana moved to have
the evidence suppressed, arguing, in relevant part, that the search was conducted without his
consent. Id., at 82.
The Idaho Court of Appeals agreed. Id., at 83. After observing that “[t]he probation
order, not the probation agreement, sets the conditions of probation,” the Court of Appeals
explained,
When Santana was told to sign the agreement, he did not have an attorney present
and was not advised that he had the right to have an attorney present. This
distinguishes Santana’s circumstances because, generally, the probation
agreement is provided to a probationer with the probation order at sentencing
where an attorney is present. In light of these facts, Santana did not choose to
waive his Fourth Amendment rights. Rather, he signed the probation agreement
because he believed doing so was a condition of his probation. It is unlikely
Santana would waive his Fourth Amendment rights unless he believed he was
required to under the terms of his probation. Mere acquiescence to a claim of
authority does not amount to consent.
Id., at 84.
The Court of Appeals went on to hold,
Thus, insofar as Santana consented to the search of his residence by signing the
probation agreement, his consent was the product of coercion. Santana did not
consent to the search of his residence when he signed the probation agreement
containing the Fourth Amendment waiver.
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Id., at 85.
The circumstances in this case are somewhat different from those in Santana, in that in
Santana, the search was conducted in the absence of the probationer, whereas Ms. Gouge was
present when the police officer searched her. However, like in Santana, Ms. Gouge’s probation
officer improperly imposed a consent to search requirement as an additional condition of
probation, and like in Santana, Ms. Gouge accepted the invalid condition because she was told
by her probation officer that doing so was a condition of her continued probation. Like in
Santana, Ms. Gouge’s acceptance of – and compliance with – the invalid condition should be
deemed a product of coercion, rendering her consent involuntary. Also, like in Santana, it is
unlikely Ms. Gouge would have waived her Fourth Amendment rights unless she believed she
was required to do so under the terms of her probation. This coerced consent remained present
when Officer Mongan questioned Ms. Gouge about whether she had signed a “search clause”
and whether she would consent to a search; it continued as Officer Mongan explained, “We just
like to do probation checks, make sure you guys are, you know, following along and not doing
things that are going to get you into trouble again.” (R., p.63.) As Ms. Gouge testified, she gave
Officer Mongan her consent, only “because I thought it was a hundred percent stipulation that I
had to do that because that’s what my P.O. told me to do,” and that “I was just trying to follow
my probation.” (Tr., p.14, Ls.19-22, p.15, Ls.18-20.)
The district court erred in finding that the consent to search was “not linked” to
Ms. Gouge’s probation, and in that refusal, failing consider the highly relevant circumstance that
Ms. Gouge’s continued probation was conditioned upon her compliance with the terms of her
probation agreement. It is clear from the context in which the consent was requested – and given
– that Ms. Gouge was being asked for consent to conduct a probation search pursuant to the
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“consent clause” she signed as part of her probation. Officer Mongan questioned only the two
probationers, asking “[as] part of your probation do you guys sign a search clause?” and “Would
you guys both be willing to consent to a search of your person?” and then “We just like to do
probation checks, make sure you guys are, you know, following along and not doing things that
are going to get you into trouble again. Make sense?” (R., pp.63, 67.) Officer Mongan’s words
clearly conveyed to Ms. Gouge that her consent was requested because she was on probation.
b.

The District Court Erred In Concluding There Was “No Evidence” That
Ms. Gouge’s Probation Officer Required Her To Consent To Law Enforcement’s
Search Requests

The district court also erred in concluding that suppression
must be denied for lack of proof on the part of Gouge, the moving party. She has not put
on any proof that she was required to consent to a request by law enforcement to search
her person.
(R., p.62.)
The district court’s ruling is wrong for two reasons: first, Ms. Gouge met her burden “as
the moving party” by establishing the search was conducted without a warrant. (See Tr., p.4,
Ls.4-7.)

The State bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that

Ms. Gouge’s consent was voluntarily given, and uncoerced.

Schneckloth, at 229; State v.

Jabora, 143 Idaho at 98. The State failed to carry that burden.
Second, the district court’s conclusion that Ms. Gouge presented “no evidence” of that
she signed a supplemental probation agreement requiring her to consent to law enforcement
searches (R., p.58) (emphasis original), is clearly erroneous.
Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, Ms. Gouge’s undisputed testimony provided
substantial evidence that her probation officer had presented her with the supplemental
agreement containing a term allowing law enforcement searches. (Tr., p.29, Ls.13-21.)
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Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a
conclusion.”

State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885 (2012).

Here, the district found that

Ms. Gouge “remembered” – not merely believed – “that in her meeting with probation that she
signed an order accepting the probation department’s I.D.O.C.’s terms and conditions that law
enforcement could search. … I find her credible that she remembered that.” (Tr., p.29, Ls.1321.) Ms. Gouge’s testimony constitutes substantial evidence that supports the district court’s
conclusion.
Moreover, the State did not object to Ms. Gouge’s testimony, nor did it argue that the
court testimony should be ignored or excluded in the absence of the written agreement. (See
generally Tr.) The State never disputed the fact that the probation officer told Ms. Gouge to sign
a probation agreement containing a term requiring searches law enforcement. (See generally Tr.)
Instead, the State appears to have conceded the fact that the probation officer had done just that.4
The State’s argument in response to Ms. Gouge’s allegations was simply that, because Officer
Mongan had not engaged in inappropriate or coercive conduct, Ms. Gouge’s consent to that
request must be deemed voluntary. (See R., pp.49-53; Tr., p.19, L.24 – p.20, L.9.) The district
court appears to have agreed with the State and thus incorrectly framed the question; the district
court asked whether “Officer Mongan’s search of Gouge was conducted pursuant to the
conditions of Gouge’s probation.” (R., p.70.) (Emphasis added.) However, the correct inquiry

4

The State’s Brief in Opposition to Motion to Suppress does not challenge Ms. Gouge’s
assertion that her probation officer told her to sign a supplemental agreement allowing law
enforcement searches. (See, R., pp.49-53.) At the suppression hearing, the State argued, “[t]he
fact that she, Ms. Gouge, may have had some incorrect ideas about the law or even correct ideas
about the law, that doesn’t matter judge. The fact that she was told by someone else to do
something else [does not] negate … that the consent was freely and voluntarily given.”
(Tr., p.19, L.24 – p.20, L.9.)
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is whether Ms. Gouge’s consent was given pursuant to the invalid terms of her probation
agreement. The undisputed testimony in this was that Ms. Gouge was erroneously informed,
albeit by her probation officer, regarding her right to refuse consent. As in Santana, her resulting
consent was the product of coercion, and therefore constitutionally invalid. See also State v.
Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 709 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting consent is coerced if police “falsely or
erroneously state they had a legitimate right to search”). Accord Bumper v. North Carolina, 391
U.S. 543 (1968) (holding consent is coerced where obtained after an officer asserts he has a
warrant when, in fact, he does not).
The State has failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that Ms. Gouge gave voluntary,
uncoerced consent, and the district court’s order denying her motion to suppress should be
reversed.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Gouge respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s denial of her
suppression motion, vacate her judgment of conviction, and remand the case to the district court
for further proceedings.
DATED this 4th day of April, 2018.
__________/s/_______________
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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